So I have never spent my college years collecting normal student experiences. In fact, I’m more likely to spend my time venturing into the bizarre. I could try to say that I produced this music video as a celebratory fusion of my work in performance arts and my Anglicanism…or you could just say that I did it because it was darn fun. Did you ever think you’d see Martin Luther dissin’ Johann Tetzel in a rap video? The clip below is the brainchild of my friend Alexander Dominitz, a young film director and cinebuff extraordinaire. For the full lyrics and much more, check it out at www.95thesesrap.com. H/t to Adrian for designing and launching the full website.
Archive for the 'Navel Gazing' Category
Hindsight being so much better, I’m now seeing the real problem with my post: I set out to explain how I got somewhere, but the process itself doesn’t make any sense until you see where it takes you. I provided a road-map and a couple of snapshots taken along the way, but no pictures of the landscape where I am now. All of that makes the whole journey pretty damned confusing to anyone who doesn’t know me (and that sometimes includes myself — Eve manages to put her finger on things I hadn’t noticed at all, and I’ll get to those).
And so I’ve gotten responses that point out problems with the things I said and problems with the things I think. As to questions of virtue and freedom and the state, I think I’ve expressed myself satisfactorily in a few of these posts. When it comes to questions of tradition and truth, though, I haven’t given such clear answers. Part of that, of course, is that I’m not sure I have them, but this conversation isn’t going to stretch the form of blogging so far that it won’t snap back: it’s giving us a tantalizing hint of a new form entirely. Which, thumbs up.
James begins his long-awaited rejoinder:
First I need to say that Nicola is making, in my estimation, a big mistake by connecting certainty to truth. Of course you can have truth without certainty. Maybe not the truth about the point at which water boils or the size of Australia, but other kinds of truth: nonempirical truths.
If that’s a mistake, I’m still making it: I don’t know how truth can function as a locus of value if we can’t know what’s true. Obviously I don’t need to be able to prove something for it to be true in some ontological sense, but how do we go about evaluating our nonempirical truths? I’m not sure we ever can — and then what do we do when we have two conflicting claims to nonempirical truth? How do we choose? Intuition? I believe that things are true, but I can’t prove them; how do I convince someone else that they’re actually true, rather than useful figments of the imagination?
So this is not to say that truth or reason are unimportant, but that we can’t construct an entire Weltanschauung on the premise that only things we’re certain of can be valuable. This is, I think, what Eve was talking about in the example of the birthday cake of existence. We don’t always start from the bottom of the pyramid and build our way up; sometimes we start with one piece of a complex system and build our way in and out from there. We take one thing we believe and look for the pieces that fit. When we emphasize coherent and intuitive truths over the straitjacket of logical consistency, we’ll never be entirely certain (because we aren’t starting from a self-evident axiom). On the other hand, if we realize that one piece of our structure can only connect to (say) mass murder, we can take that piece out and look for something better to go in its place.
That sort of evaluative reason implies an outside normative standard. Where does it come from?
I started by explaining it as love, but I don’t think that really works. My Eliot-epiphany was largely “wow, this standard-that-isn’t-logical-consistency is also a legitimate way to approach truth!” Love features as an evaluative factor, not the standard itself. When I add a bit to my worldview, I make sure it’s consistent with my valorization of love, but that’s a way of measuring whether it’s consistent with some higher good. So what is the higher good? What am I really gauging truths against when I ask myself about love?
Nicola Karras gives these two really big, intricate apparati, and says that her post is the story of how they’re hinged together, and yet we never get to see the hinge! Now, I’m honestly not sure that a blog post of any length can really draw a hinge (an epiphany) in ways that make sense to strangers. …I think Nicola is trying to describe–to use my terms rather than hers–how she came to conjoin sublimity and morality, the same weirdness of the Jews which Clive Lewis describes in the introduction to The Problem of Pain. But Yahweh is shaped exactly like a hinge, and Nicola hasn’t given us any hinge-alternative.
God would be a nice, easy answer, but I can’t do it. Shouldn’t religious faith — the kind of thing that fills your life with meaning, that changes not only how you live your life but how you see the world — require something more than “oh, that’s the best explanation I’ve heard yet”? God shouldn’t be just another piece to be slotted into my Weltanschauung; he should be the center. And he isn’t, and (here I am, caught again with the whole reason thing) I don’t have a good reason to put him there.
Can tradition provide an alternative standard? Some people seem to have read me as saying so, but it’s far more complicated; I’ll pick up on that next time.
I mentioned this “political autobiography” project for class and a few people were interested. I am one of my favorite topics, so I’m happy to share it; find out All About Me after the jump. (I feel very silly about this.) This is more of an attempt to trace my development than the actual content of my thoughts — that’s a much more interesting story.
“La Contre-Révolution ne sera pas une révolution contraire, mais le contraire de la Révolution.” — Maistre.
From the end of my “political autobiography” (for class):
More than anything else, I am concerned with how we think about things, and what that means to us in terms of living both virtuous and fulfilling lives. I’ve long since stopped caring about labels: call me a conservative, a libertarian, a reactionary — just don’t call me late for the counterrevolution.
Now to finish write the other two papers due tomorrow. (Note to my mother: just kidding!)
Rule: I take criticism poorly. I find it irritating. But I don’t find it disturbing.
Exception: The commenter who responded to my YDN column about the lack of explanation surrounding increased campus police presence by asking, “What are you trying to hide?”
Oh, right, I forgot. Only the most shamefully degenerate college student would ever engage in illegal activity. Like underage drinking. Or file-sharing. Or jaywalking.
Of course, that’s not only a straw man but an inaccurate one. The real assumption is that it’s foolish to think that the police would ever care about the illegal things students do, because their sole purpose is to protect us from the bad guys. Sure, this comes from a place of blind faith in the institution — “Of course the University has nothing but our best interests at heart!” — but also from entitlement: “We pay their salaries with our tuition, they have no choice but to be on our side!”
There’s also the fact that the closer you get to having decision-making power yourself, the sillier it seems to scrutinize the intentions of power (Obama on FISA, anyone?). But as dangerous as it is to rationalize that “When I’m in charge it will all be okay,” it’s more troubling to assume that there’s some sort of mutual understanding between “decision-making people,” that they have the same interests at heart — and, furthermore, that those interests are necessarily in the best interests of society. That it goes without saying that the police are here to protect students from the strangers roaming their courtyards, and to imply otherwise is not just ridiculous but rude. What are they supposed to be around to protect, anyway? The law?
I was going to blog about yesterday’s YPU debate with John Mearsheimer, but Philip Weiss has done it for me. He gives a great impression of the debate (and the peculiarity of the Union as an institution), and he gets us right.
Before it got going Will Wilson and his friend Nicola Karras of the Party of the Right came over to introduce themselves. Wilson is burly and looks like a wildhaired Irish orator. He wore a 1776 tie and had read my work in the American Conservative. Nicola was smaller, quieter, hair pulled back. Will was to be one of the speakers. I thought, Maybe she is Will’s acolyte.
Don’t give him any ideas…
I check out the blog stats every once in a while, and sometimes people find us via Google searches I can only describe as…strange.
The Peculiar:
different ways to care for chickens
unfortunate sex images
want to make molds for banisters
what is the spiritual significance of the navel
The “Good Question”:
does sarah palin smoke cigarette
why do pornstars keep their shoes on?
what do social theorist do for us
The Sublime:
men in suits throwing pies
everything is performative
uses of cigarettes and alcohols equals modernity

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