Archive for the 'Navel Gazing' Category

I Got 95 Theses But A Pope Ain’t One

So I have never spent my college years collecting normal student experiences. In fact, I’m more likely to spend my time venturing into the bizarre. I could try to say that I produced this music video as a celebratory fusion of my work in performance arts and my Anglicanism…or you could just say that I did it because it was darn fun. Did you ever think you’d see Martin Luther dissin’ Johann Tetzel in a rap video? The clip below is the brainchild of my friend Alexander Dominitz, a young film director and cinebuff extraordinaire. For the full lyrics and much more, check it out at www.95thesesrap.com. H/t to Adrian for designing and launching the full website.

Faith, hope, love: two out of three ain’t bad.

Hindsight being so much better, I’m now seeing the real problem with my post: I set out to explain how I got somewhere, but the process itself doesn’t make any sense until you see where it takes you. I provided a road-map and a couple of snapshots taken along the way, but no pictures of the landscape where I am now. All of that makes the whole journey pretty damned confusing to anyone who doesn’t know me (and that sometimes includes myself — Eve manages to put her finger on things I hadn’t noticed at all, and I’ll get to those).

And so I’ve gotten responses that point out problems with the things I said and problems with the things I think. As to questions of virtue and freedom and the state, I think I’ve expressed myself satisfactorily in a few of these posts. When it comes to questions of tradition and truth, though, I haven’t given such clear answers. Part of that, of course, is that I’m not sure I have them, but this conversation isn’t going to stretch the form of blogging so far that it won’t snap back: it’s giving us a tantalizing hint of a new form entirely. Which, thumbs up.

James begins his long-awaited rejoinder:

First I need to say that Nicola is making, in my estimation, a big mistake by connecting certainty to truth. Of course you can have truth without certainty. Maybe not the truth about the point at which water boils or the size of Australia, but other kinds of truth: nonempirical truths.

If that’s a mistake, I’m still making it: I don’t know how truth can function as a locus of value if we can’t know what’s true. Obviously I don’t need to be able to prove something for it to be true in some ontological sense, but how do we go about evaluating our nonempirical truths? I’m not sure we ever can — and then what do we do when we have two conflicting claims to nonempirical truth? How do we choose? Intuition? I believe that things are true, but I can’t prove them; how do I convince someone else that they’re actually true, rather than useful figments of the imagination?

So this is not to say that truth or reason are unimportant, but that we can’t construct an entire Weltanschauung on the premise that only things we’re certain of can be valuable. This is, I think, what Eve was talking about in the example of the birthday cake of existence. We don’t always start from the bottom of the pyramid and build our way up; sometimes we start with one piece of a complex system and build our way in and out from there. We take one thing we believe and look for the pieces that fit. When we emphasize coherent and intuitive truths over the straitjacket of logical consistency, we’ll never be entirely certain (because we aren’t starting from a self-evident axiom). On the other hand, if we realize that one piece of our structure can only connect to (say) mass murder, we can take that piece out and look for something better to go in its place.

That sort of evaluative reason implies an outside normative standard. Where does it come from?

I started by explaining it as love, but I don’t think that really works. My Eliot-epiphany was largely “wow, this standard-that-isn’t-logical-consistency is also a legitimate way to approach truth!” Love features as an evaluative factor, not the standard itself. When I add a bit to my worldview, I make sure it’s consistent with my valorization of love, but that’s a way of measuring whether it’s consistent with some higher good. So what is the higher good? What am I really gauging truths against when I ask myself about love?

Eve has a suggestion:

Nicola Karras gives these two really big, intricate apparati, and says that her post is the story of how they’re hinged together, and yet we never get to see the hinge! Now, I’m honestly not sure that a blog post of any length can really draw a hinge (an epiphany) in ways that make sense to strangers. …I think Nicola is trying to describe–to use my terms rather than hers–how she came to conjoin sublimity and morality, the same weirdness of the Jews which Clive Lewis describes in the introduction to The Problem of Pain. But Yahweh is shaped exactly like a hinge, and Nicola hasn’t given us any hinge-alternative.

God would be a nice, easy answer, but I can’t do it. Shouldn’t religious faith — the kind of thing that fills your life with meaning, that changes not only how you live your life but how you see the world — require something more than “oh, that’s the best explanation I’ve heard yet”? God shouldn’t be just another piece to be slotted into my Weltanschauung; he should be the center. And he isn’t, and (here I am, caught again with the whole reason thing) I don’t have a good reason to put him there.

Can tradition provide an alternative standard? Some people seem to have read me as saying so, but it’s far more complicated; I’ll pick up on that next time.

Pay no attention to Caesar. Caesar doesn’t have the slightest idea what’s really going on.

Serious philosophical questions and midterms do not mix well.

I have so many things floating around in my head, including some thoughts on capitalism vs. culture, but it’s mostly responses to the responses. Some of my favorites (and you should really read the whole things, because they say far more than I can quote):

EAT THE APPLE

Virtue ? That is your responsibility, whilst it may be nice to think of the spartans whipping virtue into the young, wishing you too could have the rest of modern society from its crack addicts to perverts to slothful today tonight watchers pushed towards a life of virtue, to do that is to deny their humanity, deny their choice and ultimately deny that they have any possibility of a virtuous life. For virtue can not simply be external behaviour rote learned. It has to be valued and sought after by the individual, not simply a pattern of behaviour forced upon an individual if they are to survive and participate in the community.

We may not be a virtuous society today, and many individuals may not express such a character. But for the first time in human history it is at least possible and an option. One built on a real foundation of respect towards us as humans who can choose individual achievement towards nobility, not a forced behaviour as if mere pet dogs trained to beg and bark on command.

You can seek community, or you can seek virtue. Not both, and likely neither with modern conservatism.

(Chasing the Norm)

SHE SAID PERFORMATIVITY! …WELL, SHE SHOULD HAVE.

A good play can change not just a man’s life but his identity, but only if he “believes” it in a very particular way. He can’t really believe it—if he does, he’ll rush onstage to try and stop Oedipus from blinding himself!—but neither can he keep in the front of his mind that it’s just his friend Jeff in an Oedipus mask. That’s the kind of belief I have in my traditions, especially those that can’t be traced back to divine revelation. More on why traditionalism isn’t relativism here. I’d excerpt, but this post is long enough already; let it suffice to say that Oscar Wilde was my kind of conservative.

(Helen at Pomocon)

YOU KEEP USING THAT WORD. I DO NOT THINK IT MEANS WHAT YOU THINK IT MEANS.

Here is what I think: I think “postmodernism” is a great way to justify excessive navel-gazing, obtuse writing, obfuscated thinking, and various forms of related wankery. (But if anyone wants to convince me otherwise with a concise definition of the term, the comments are open below.)

(Another Damned Blog)

THE STATE: WHAT’S UP WITH THAT?

My deeper point is that by not locating our own context/position, political discussions that are abstract (What is The Fundamental Issue?) assume a one-size-fits-all answer for all times and places.  And they can inadvertently end up supporting a point of view I doubt (esp. in this case) the author really holds to.  Moreover, a great deal depends on our location in terms of what we see/pick up on.

If postmodernism (conservative and/or liberal) taught us anything it’s that meaning is contextual and that contexts are never-ending, hence all our statements (including this one) are provisional.  [Provisional however can be a very long time--point to pomocons].  My take is the best way to deal with that reality is to be as honest as we can about our own position and just say it out. In that way I think there is more an invitation to debate and dialogue than a framing that says “X Issue is THE One” and then creates sharp divisions between those who stand on either side of X. When often, the reality, I would say, is never that clear or simple.

(Indistinct Union)

TO DEFINE CONSISTENCY AS TRUTH IS TO DENY THE EXISTENCE OF TRUTH

I would substitute her categorical rejection of rationalism and a firm commitment to community with the following maxim: It is the conservative’s job to remain permanently uncomfortable with existence. Because it is precisely when we think we have arrived at final answers–whether they reside in reason or in community–that we actually become susceptible to totalitarianism. We shoud firmly accept, as the late Judge Learned Hand once declared, that “The true spirit of liberty is the spirit that is not too sure that it is right.” This belief was at the heart of the American Founding, and it is, sadly, a belief that has all but evaporated in today’s destructive partisan politics.

Conservatism should be about ideas and ideals, not about emotional appeals to interpersonal connections, and there is simply no way to arrive at the “right” ideas without reason. This element of balance is what seems to be missing from the worldview that Karass has arrived at.

(Exit Cave Right)

MY BELOVED IS MINE AND I AM…WHOSE?

To the extent that this is a love story in which the beloved(s) remain intentionally unnamed, I can understand your interlocutors’ frustration! WHOM one loves (whether a person, a Person, or a persona e.g. a tradition) makes an enormous difference….

I can guess at a few possible beloveds; and you say yourself that this is a story of the shape of your thoughts rather than their content, but obviously it’s really difficult to separate shape from content, and I wonder if your decision to attempt the separation wasn’t a mistake.

I’m hoping that this reading of Nicola’s post is reasonably accurate. Because there are several different ways to read it, and a love story with a beloved (or beloveds) she can actually name would be the best one. A love story in which the identity of the mystery date hasn’t been revealed, but she thinks it might, and she’s going on a detective search–that’s also good.

(Eve — and seriously, read the whole thing. I think she groks me in a way that I don’t grok myself, which is always cool if a little scary.)

I promise I’ll get to all of this, not least because I can’t sit still until I do. In the meantime, feel free to discuss in comments.

In other news, I really, really want this shirt:

Burke is dead.

Freddie dissects me and comes up short:

…I was sure I had missed something: where was the resolution to Karras’s existential crisis? Where was the moment where she found her access to the truth that frees her from the spiritual emptiness that pure intellect had left her with? I couldn’t find it, and can’t. I find instead her (very understandable) sense of loss at the dissolution of real authority and real certainty, and the choice to embrace foundationalism and its political child, conservatism.

He couldn’t identify the moment where I found “access to the truth” because I didn’t. That is, in a way, the whole point. The problem with that rationalism was the human inability to grasp truth by itself. I spent my time looking for something that I could be sure was true, and I couldn’t find it. I still haven’t. I’m not certain. My realization was not of the truth of anything in particular, but in the fact that I could have meaning without the certainty of truth.

So yes, of course my “ethic is an ethic of necessity, not of truth.” Truth would be lovely. Truth would, I imagine, give me some objective meaning. But meaning also comes from the search.

This is a willed belief in tradition, a knowing choice of old institutions, the inherently meta rejection of the meta. “I had been drowning, and looking back I saw how easy it would have been to latch on to something murderous to save myself.” Not, “the life raft was the reality of Christ/community/tradition/etc”. Instead, the pure pragmatism at grasping at whatever piece of driftwood happened to float by. This is postmodern premodernism, and it has become kind of popular.

I may not have been clear, and in retrospect the whole drowning thing is a dubious analogy. Let me try to explain myself again: when we regard foundationalism as the best way to understand the world, we are desperate for some foundational principle. We will grasp at whatever driftwood floats by. When I thank my lucky stars, it isn’t for the fact that I happened to grab a particularly benign piece of driftwood but that I realized I didn’t have to grab one at all.

How does that work? It segues nicely into Freddie’s questions about tradition and postmodernity:

How can traditionalism survive, when you know that mere human subjectivity is the source of tradition? Conservatism has tradtionally been suspicious, even hateful, of postmodern skepticism towards meta-narratives. I think many of the pomocons believe that they can have the destabilizing nature of postmodernism and yet still knowingly choose the stability of classical forms, traditional mores. But the old school conservatives abhor the postmodern for a reason. They know the limits of willed obediance to the past, they recognize the fragility of any conservatism of choice.

I’m not one of the arbiters of Pomoconservatism, but I’ll give this a shot. My emphasis on tradition is not, God knows, because I discovered that tradition is objectively correct. It’s not even because I’ve decided to think that tradition is objectively correct. (The former is impossible; the latter is lame.) Rather, it’s because tradition does form us, because tradition does give us meaning. We have to examine it and search for truth within it, because if truth is the sort of thing that can be found, that’s the only place we’ll find it.

Freddie is right: you cannot choose to be premodern. Those who have eaten from the tree of knowledge cannot forget. There is something pathetic about the conservatives who try to pretend they missed the Enlightenment. But if a postmodern conservatism does not stick its fingers in its ears (”la la la la, William of Ockham, I can’t heeeeeear you…”), it also does not insist that I have chosen my choice and that’s that.

Postmodern conservatism is a reflection of the fact that the veils have already been stripped off; tradition has already lost its reflexive hold on us. It still shapes us, but we recognize that it is to some degree arbitrary. The values we want to see in the world are informed by our tradition, but because we know that, any attempt at change must be a reflective, self-conscious process.

So what is the project of postmodern conservatism? Is it, as I think Freddie understands it, to justify conservatism in the language of postmodernity? Or is it the first steps towards overcoming?

How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Vast Right-Wing Conspiracy

I mentioned this “political autobiography” project for class and a few people were interested. I am one of my favorite topics, so I’m happy to share it; find out All About Me after the jump. (I feel very silly about this.) This is more of an attempt to trace my development than the actual content of my thoughts — that’s a much more interesting story.

More…

Ten pages down, ten to go.

La Contre-Révolution ne sera pas une révolution contraire, mais le contraire de la Révolution.” — Maistre.

From the end of my “political autobiography” (for class):

More than anything else, I am concerned with how we think about things, and what that means to us in terms of living both virtuous and fulfilling lives. I’ve long since stopped caring about labels: call me a conservative, a libertarian, a reactionary — just don’t call me late for the counterrevolution.

Now to finish write the other two papers due tomorrow. (Note to my mother: just kidding!)

Breaking down is easy

One of my new favorite professors, R. Howard Bloch, dropped a few sentences yesterday that overwhelmed me with happiness - suddenly made my ego felt justified in its hyperactivity. We were reading the self-justifying memoir of the great scholastic philosopher Abelard (’im what got ‘is bits chopped off for bonking Heloise) and discussing the spectacular arrogance of a man convinced he was constantly being persecuted by his jealous inferiors. And that’s when Professor Bloch dropped in this:

Paranoia is the purest form of literary criticism. It’s the product of an incessantly interpretive mind. Imposing patterns upon patterns of self reference, it places the self center and everything is filtered through its relationship with the interpreter. And the best thing about is that it’s totally incontrovertible. It’s based purely on a closed system, a set of subjective references set upon each each other.

Apologies if I’ve misworded it in remembrance. It should be obvious why this is great stuff, as a casual extension of work done by 20th century theorists on the ways in which patterns of literary expression manifest the patterns of our psychological processes. For the best examples, see the work of another much beloved professor, Peter Brooks, for whom the Freudian balance between repetition and teleology becomes a model for how narrative prevents a novel’s plot from foreclosing too quickly:

narrative must tend toward its end, seek illumination in its own death. Yet this must be the right death…Deviance, detour…these are characteristics of the narratable…Plot is a kind of arabesque or squiggle toward the end.

But the reason I’m excited about paranoid literary criticism today is that it relates the psychology of the literary critic to the psychology of the blogger. The blogger obsessively creates links upon links, tracing patterns of influence and tracking exactly whence everyone is getting their ideas. A hardcore blogger will find a way to relate every interesting new story back to her own obsessions. Such constantly linkage makes for closed self-referential communities riddled with extensive mutual analysis. Maybe that’s why the sharpest literary critics I’ve known are also the most successful bloggers. It’s all great fun, just like literary criticism and paranoia.

It may be a surveillance society, but it’s our surveillance society.

Rule: I take criticism poorly. I find it irritating. But I don’t find it disturbing.

Exception: The commenter who responded to my YDN column about the lack of explanation surrounding increased campus police presence by asking, “What are you trying to hide?”

Oh, right, I forgot. Only the most shamefully degenerate college student would ever engage in illegal activity. Like underage drinking. Or file-sharing. Or jaywalking.

Of course, that’s not only a straw man but an inaccurate one. The real assumption is that it’s foolish to think that the police would ever care about the illegal things students do, because their sole purpose is to protect us from the bad guys. Sure, this comes from a place of blind faith in the institution — “Of course the University has nothing but our best interests at heart!” — but also from entitlement: “We pay their salaries with our tuition, they have no choice but to be on our side!”

There’s also the fact that the closer you get to having decision-making power yourself, the sillier it seems to scrutinize the intentions of power (Obama on FISA, anyone?). But as dangerous as it is to rationalize that “When I’m in charge it will all be okay,” it’s more troubling to assume that there’s some sort of mutual understanding between “decision-making people,” that they have the same interests at heart — and, furthermore, that those interests are necessarily in the best interests of society. That it goes without saying that the police are here to protect students from the strangers roaming their courtyards, and to imply otherwise is not just ridiculous but rude. What are they supposed to be around to protect, anyway? The law?

Shiksa Countries Are for Practice

I was going to blog about yesterday’s YPU debate with John Mearsheimer, but Philip Weiss has done it for me. He gives a great impression of the debate (and the peculiarity of the Union as an institution), and he gets us right.

Read the whole thing.

Before it got going Will Wilson and his friend Nicola Karras of the Party of the Right came over to introduce themselves. Wilson is burly and looks like a wildhaired Irish orator. He wore a 1776 tie and had read my work in the American Conservative. Nicola was smaller, quieter, hair pulled back. Will was to be one of the speakers. I thought, Maybe she is Will’s acolyte.

Don’t give him any ideas…

Strange Google Hits

I check out the blog stats every once in a while, and sometimes people find us via Google searches I can only describe as…strange.

The Peculiar:
different ways to care for chickens
unfortunate sex images
want to make molds for banisters
what is the spiritual significance of the navel

The “Good Question”:
does sarah palin smoke cigarette
why do pornstars keep their shoes on?
what do social theorist do for us

The Sublime:
men in suits throwing pies
everything is performative
uses of cigarettes and alcohols equals modernity